‘The Self alone is to be meditated upon’ (I. iv. 7); ‘Of all these, this Self alone should be realised” (Ibid.), for ‘It is dearer than a son’ etc. (I. iv. 8). In the course of explanation of the above passages already introduced, the aim of knowledge and its relation to that aim have been stated in the sentence. ‘It knew only Itself as, “I am Brahman.” Therefore It became all’ (I. iv. io). Thus it has been mentioned that the inner Self is the domain of knowledge. While that of ignorance is relative existence, which consists of the ends and means of rites with ñve factors, which again depend on the division of men into four castes.; it is by nature alternatively manifest and unmanifest like the tree and the seed, and is made up of name, form and action. This relative existence has been dealt with in the passage beginning with, ‘He (who worships another god thinking), “He is one, and I am another,” does not know’ (I. iv. io), and concluded in the passage, ‘This indeed consists of three things: name, form and action’ (I. vi. i). One aspect of it is in accordance with the scriptures and makes for progress leading up to the world of Hiraṇyagarbha; while the other aspect is not in accordance with the scriptures and causes degradation down to the level of stationary objects. All this has already been shown in the section beginning with, ‘Two classes of Prajāpati’s sons,’ etc. (I. iii. 1). In order to show how a man disgusted with this domain of ignorance can qualify himself for the knowledge of Brahman, which deals with the inner Self, the entire domain of ignorance has been concluded in the first chapter. But in the second chapter, after introducing the inner Self, which is the domain of the knowledge of Brahman, in the words, ‘I will tell you about Brahman’ (II. i. 1), and ‘I will instruct you about Brahman’ (II. i. 15), the Śruti has taught about that Brahman, the one without a second devoid of all differences, by eliminating, in the wrods, ‘Not this, not this,’ all material qualities summed up in the word ‘truth,’ which by its very nature comprises action, its factors and its results. As part of this knowledge of Brahman, the Śruti wishes to enjoin renunciation.
Rites with five factors such as wife, son and wealth constitute the domain of ignorance, because they do not lead to the attainment of the Self. If a thing calculated to produce a particular result is applied to bring about a different result, it frustrates its purpose. Running or walking is not the means to appease one’s hunger or thirst. The son and the rest have been prescribed in the Śruti as means to the attainment of the world of men, of the Manes and of the gods, not as means to the attainment of the Self. They have been mentioned as producing those specific results. And they have not been enjoined on the knower of Brahman, being classed by the Śruti as rites with material ends, in the passage, ‘This much indeed is desire’ (I. iv. 17). And the knower of Brahman has already attained all desires; he cannot for that very reason have any more desires. The Śruti too says. ‘We who have attained this Self, this world’ (IV. iv. 22).
But there are some who hold that even a knower of Brahman has desires. They have certainly never heard the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, nor of the distinction made by the Śruti that the desire for a son and so forth belongs to an ignorant man, and that with regard to the domain of knowledge, the statement, ‘What shall we achieve through children, we who have attained this Self, this world?’ and so on, is applicable. They do not also know the contradiction, based on incongruity, between the attainment of knowledge, which obliterates all action with its factors and results, and ignorance together with its effects. Nor have they heard Vyāsa’s statement (on the subject). The contradiction rests on the opposite trends of the nature of rites and that of knowledge, which partake respectively of ignorance and illumination. On being asked, ‘There are two Vedic injunctions: Perform rites, and give up rites. What is the goal of knowledge, and what of rites? I wish to be enlightened on this. So please instruct me. These two (it seems) are mutually contradictory and run counter to each other’ (Mbh. XIl^. ccxlvii. i-2), Vyāsa replied, thereby showing the contradiction, ‘Men are bound by rites and freed by knowledge. Hence sages who have known the truth never perform rites,’ and so on (Ibid., verse 7). Therefore the knowledge of Brahman leads to the highest goal for man not with, but without the help of any auxiliary means, for otherwise there would be contradiction all round. It is to show this that renunciation of the world, which consists in giving up all means, is sought to be enjoined as a subsidiary step. For at the end of the fourth chapter it has been asserted, ‘This much indeed is (the means of) immortality, my dear’; and we have also a sign for inference (about this) in the fact that Yājñavalkya, who was a ritualist, renounced the world.
Moreover, the knowledge of Brahman as a means to immortality has been imparted to Maitreyī, who was without the means to perform rites. Also wealth has been deprecated. If rites were means to immortality, the derogatory remarks about wealth would be out of place, since on it rites with five factors depend. If, however, rites are desired to be shunned, then it is proper to decry the means to them. Besides (in the state of knowledge) there is an absence of the consciousness about caste, order of life, etc., which are the qualifications for the performance of rites, as we see in the passages, ‘The Brāhmaṇa ousts one’ (II. iv. 6; IV. v. 7), ‘The Kṣatriya ousts one,’ etc. (Ibid.). When one ceases to consider oneself a Brāhmaṇa, a Kṣatriya, or the like, there is certainly no room for such injunctions as that this is the duty of Brāhmaṇas, or that this is the duty of Kṣatriyas, for there are no such persons. For a man who does not identify himself as a Brāhmaṇa, a Kṣatriya, or the like, rites and their accessories, which are the effects of that consciousness, are automatically dropped because of the giving up of that consciousness. Therefore this story is introduced with a view to enjoining renunciation of •the world as part of the knowledge of the Self.
मैत्रेयीति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः, उद्यास्यन्वा अरेऽहमस्मात्स्थानादस्मि, हन्त तेऽनया कात्यायन्यान्तं करवाणीति || 1 ||
maitreyīti hovāca yājñavalkyaḥ, udyāsyanvā are’hamasmātsthānādasmi, hanta te’nayā kātyāyanyāntaṃ karavāṇīti || 1 ||
1. ‘Maitreyī, my dear,’ said Yājñavalkya, ‘I am going to renounce this life.’ Allow me to finish between you and Kātyāyanī.
The sage Yājñavalkya addressing his wife, Maitreyī, said, ‘Maitreyī, I am going to renounce this householder’s life —I intend to take up the life of renunciation, which is the next higher life. Hence I ask your permission.—The particle ‘are’ is a vocative.—Further I wish to finish between you and my second wife, Kātyāyanī, i.e. put an end to the relationship that existed between you through me, your common husband; by dividing my property between you I will separate you through wealth, and go.’